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Populism, Backlash and the Ongoing Use of 
the World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement System: State Responses to the 
Appellate Body Crisis 
IMOGEN SAUNDERS†  
ABSTRACT 
Since 2017, World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) 
Member States have been unable to reach a consensus on 
Appellate Body (‘AB’) appointments and reappointments.  
The United States is spearheading a populist backlash 
against procedural and substantive aspects of the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. As a consequence of this, the 
AB is now facing an unprecedented crisis.  The jewel in the 
crown of the WTO dispute settlement system will be 
missing: yet countries are still bringing complaints.  This 
paper considers US actions through the framing of 
populism and backlash, and assesses responses from other 
countries. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’) Appellate Body 
(‘AB’) was once considered the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the WTO 
dispute settlement system.  The WTO came into being in 1995, almost 
50 years after the ill-fated Havana Charter—intended to establish the 
International Trade Organization (‘ITO’)—failed to gain US 
Congressional Approval and subsequently never came into force.  
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While the ITO floundered, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (‘GATT’) did come into force: but without an institutional body 
overseeing it, or an agreed dispute settlement system, it operated in a 
quasi-legal, diplomatic fashion.  Swathes of trade areas were excluded 
in practice from its purview, and disputes were managed by ad-hoc 
arbitration panels and governed by principles of consensus.  A panel 
was only formed if all GATT members (including the State accused of 
breaching the treaty) agreed: and its findings only adopted on the same 
basis. By the time the Uruguay Round began in 1986, with the object 
of creating a new international trade institution, it was obvious that a 
more rigorous dispute settlement system was needed.  The WTO 
dispute settlement system has two key differences from the GATT 
years.   
First, rather than disputes being decided by an arbitral panel 
alone, a two-stage appellate process was adopted.  Disputes are heard 
in the first instance by a WTO panel, formed on an ad-hoc basis for 
each dispute.  From the panel decision there is an automatic right of 
appeal to the AB.  The AB is a permanent body, intended to consist of 
seven members, three of which sit to hear any given appeal.  While 
panel members do not need legal qualifications, AB members must be 
‘a person of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements 
generally’.1  The permanence of the AB means there is consistency in 
the law; and the legal qualifications of its members has seen it acting 
more like a true international court than an ad-hoc arbitral panel more 
concerned with finding an outcome satisfactory to both parties than the 
rigorous application of the law.  For example, although as in all 
international courts, precedence as understood in domestic systems 
does not apply, the AB nonetheless has made clear that it both expects 
WTO panels to follow previous AB reasoning where relevant, and that 
the AB itself will, in usual circumstances, follow its own previous 
reasoning. 
Second, the model of consensus has been flipped.  WTO panels 
are now automatically formed unless there is consensus not do so – 
including agreement from the State who has brought the dispute in the 
first place.  Similarly, reports from the WTO Panels and the AB are 
automatically adopted, unless there is consensus not to adopt 
(including from the State who has ‘won’ the case).  This essentially 
 
 1.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art 17.3., 1867 
UNTS 3, (1995). 
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ended the opt-out nature of dispute settlement during the GATT years, 
and created a compulsory dispute settlement system in its place. 
For over twenty years this system worked fairly well – albeit with 
grumblings regarding delays, as the time taken for delivery of WTO 
Panel and AB reports routinely exceeded the (one could say overly 
optimistic) timelines set in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.2  In 
some ways, the dispute system was a victim of its own success: as the 
case load increased, the ability of the system to deal with matters in a 
timely fashion decreased.  However, the situation facing the WTO 
dispute system today is wholly different. It is facing ‘unprecedented 
challenges’3 – stripped of its intended seven members to only one, and 
unable to hear appeals.  Crucially, as WTO panel reports are not 
binding if appealed, the crippling of the AB is in fact the crippling of 
the dispute settlement system as a whole.  Without a functioning AB, 
there is no institutional capacity to provide binding dispute settlement 
results.  Parties to a dispute may agree not to appeal (thus allowing the 
WTO panel report to be binding); or to go outside the system to 
alternative arbitration in lieu of appeal: but any such options cannot be 
compelled by either the WTO or other States.  The compulsory and 
binding dispute resolution system established in 1994 has effectively 
been broken. 
Much has been written on this issue, looking at causes (including 
the legitimacy of the US complaints) as well as potential solutions.4  
This article instead focusses on understanding the current situation 
through the twin frameworks of populism and backlash, as well as 
interrogating what States have actually done in response to the crisis.  
To do so, the article will first briefly set out the events that have led to 
the incapacitation of the WTO AB. It will then consider the challenge 
 
 2.  See Louise Johannesson & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Dispute Settlement System 
1995-2016: A Data Set and Its Descriptive Statistics, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 357 (2017) (for an 
overview of the difference between the treaty limits and actual time taken). 
 3.  Ujal Singh Bhatia, Statement by Appellate Body Chair (June 22, 2018). 
 4.  See Jennifer Hillman, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s 
Appellate Body: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly?, GEORGETOWN U. LAW CTR. (2018), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-
Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf; Elvire Fabry & Erik Tate, Saving the WTO Appellate Body or Returning 
to the Wild West of Trade? NOTRE EUR. (June 7, 2018), http://institutdelors.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/SavingtheWTOAppellateBody-FabryTate-June2018.pdf; Cosette D. 
Creamer, Can International Trade Law Recover? From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to its Jewel 
of Crowns, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 51 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.1; Alex Ansong, 
The WTO Appellate Body: Are There Any Viable Solutions?, 14(4) GLOBAL TRADE AND 
CUSTOMS J. 169 (2019); JENS LEHNE, CRISIS AT THE WTO: IS THE BLOCKING OF APPOINTMENTS 
TO THE WTO APPELLATE BODY BY THE UNITED STATES LEGALLY JUSTIFIED? (Carl Grossman 
ed., 2019). 
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through the lens of populism and against the context of backlashes to 
other international courts.  It will finally engage in analysis of use of 
the AB during the relevant time period and consider why States 
continue to use the DSU. 
II. EVENTS LEADING TO INCAPACITATION 
In May 2016, the US made waves when it did not support the re-
appointment of South Korean Judge Seung Wha Chang.  The US had 
previously blocked appointments of US judges, but never the national 
of another country.5 The reasons given included that he served on 
appeals that included too much obiter dicta,6 engaged in abstract 
decisions,7 went beyond the arguments of the parties;8 and made a 
‘problematic and erroneous approach to reviewing a Member’s 
domestic law’.9 This was met with international concern and 
condemnation from other States as well as the sitting and former AB 
members.10 Ultimately, Hyun Chong Kim was appointed to replace 
Seung Wha Chang on 23 November, along with Hong Zhao to replace 
Yuiejiao Zhang. It seemed the normal functioning of the Appellate 
Body appointment process had been restored. 
This was, however, a short-lived respite.  The US has adopted a 
policy of deliberately blocking new appointments and re-appointments 
from June 2017 – December 2019. On 30 June 2017, Ricardo Ramirez-
Hernandez’s second term expired, and no replacement member was 
elected.  On 1 August 2017 Hyun Chong Kim resigned to take up the 
position of Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy in the South Korean 
Government.  No replacement member was elected to fill this vacancy. 
This was followed by the expiration of Peter Van den Bossche’s 
second term on 11 December 2017.  Again, no replacement was 
appointed. On 3 September 2018, Shree Baboo Chekitan’s re-
appointment was blocked: leaving three members left on the Appellate 
Body.  This is the minimum number to function, and although the 
already burdensome workload increased with less members, the AB 
 
 5.  The U.S. blocked the reappointment of Jennifer Hillman in 2011 and the proposed 
appointment of James Gathii in 2013. 
 6. Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(2016), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf. 
 7.  Id. at 4. 
 8.  Id. at 4-5. 
 9.  Id. at 5. 
 10.  See letter from Ambassador Xavier Carim Of South Africa to Chairman of Dispute 
Settlement Body, World Trade Organization, dated May 31, 2016, 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/abletter.pdf. 
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continued its work. 
However, at midnight on 10 December 2019, the terms of Ujal 
Singh Bhatia and Thomas R Graham expired, leaving Hong Zhao as 
the only remaining AB member.  It seems unlikely any consensus will 
be reached to fill these vacancies – or indeed any of the six positions 
now vacant.  The stated reasons for US actions in blocking 
appointments has changed very little since the blocking of Hyun 
Chong Kim in 2017.  They were articulated in a July 2019 statement 
of the Office of the US Trade Representative on the Appellate Report 
on China – Countervailing Duties: 
This report also illustrates the concerns the United States has been 
raising about the Appellate Body’s functioning, including adding to 
WTO Member obligations and diminishing their rights, exceeding the 
mandatory 90-day deadline for reports, permitting individuals to 
continue to serve on appeals past the end of their terms, engaging in 
fact-finding on appeal, and treating prior reports as precedent.11 
Although there is some suggestion that other countries share (at 
least some of) these concerns,12 there has been no public support for 
the US actions in blocking appointments from other WTO members. 
III. THE AB CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF POPULISM 
There are many differing definitions and conceptions of 
populism: different fields may have different understandings of the 
term, and discussions of populism may vary wildly as a result.13  In 
particular, there is a schism between thick and thin populism.  Thick 
populism draws from historical practice and intrinsically links the term 
with certain political positions historically identified as populist.14 Thin 
populism, in contrast, divorces the term from the content of the 
political position and instead focusses on the method: populism as a 
‘way of “doing politics”‘.15  For both thick and thin conceptions of 
populism, certain elements can be pulled out to analyze the current AB 
 
 11.  Statement on WTO Appellate Report on China Countervailing Duties, Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (16 July 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/statement-wto-appellate-report-china. 
 12.  See Creamer, supra note 5, at 52. 
 13.  See Mark A. Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Populism, 
Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. L.J. 233 (2001). 
 14.  Id. at 234. 
 15.  Janne E. Nijman & Wouter E. Werner, Populism and International Law: What 
Backlash and Which Rubicon?, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L. 3, 6 (2018). 
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crisis. 
A. Thick Populism:  Producerism and Anti-Elitism 
There are there central elements of populism over time: 
‘producerism, religiosity, and anti-elitism’.16  Two of these – 
producerism and anti-elitism – are most directly relevant. 
Populist producerism is the belief that “only those who created 
wealth in tangible, material ways (on and under the land, in workshops, 
on the sea) could be trusted to guard the nation’s piety and liberties.”17  
In contrast, elites are viewed as ‘everything that devout producers . . . 
were not: condescending, profligate, artificial, effete, manipulative, 
given to intellectual instead of practical thinking, and dependent on the 
labor of others.’18 
With this in mind, we can consider a statement made by President 
Trump as he campaigned in 2016.  Against the backdrop of a metals 
recycling facility (a producer), he stated: 
So today I’m going to talk about how to make America wealthy 
again. We have to do it. With 30-miles from Steel City, Pittsburgh 
played a central role in building our nation. The legacy of Pennsylvania 
steelworkers lives in the bridges, railways and skyscrapers that make 
up our a great American landscape. [sic] 
But our workers’ loyalty was repaid, you know it better than 
anybody, with total betrayal. Our politicians have aggressively pursued 
a policy of globalization, moving our jobs, our wealth and our factories 
to Mexico and overseas. Globalization has made the financial elite, 
who donate to politicians, very, very wealthy.19 
The message is clear: the producers have been betrayed by the 
elites – both financial and political.  The same primacy of producers is 
evident in President Trump’s November 2019 speech at the Economic 
Club of New York, where he stated ‘We have ended the war on 
American workers, we have stopped the assault on American 
industry…’20  The political elites are once again criticized: ‘They 
 
 16.  Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. OF RICH. L. REV. 373, 387 
(2000). 
 17.  MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (Cornell 
University Press 1995). 
 18.  Id. at 15.  See also, Graber, supra note 17, at 387-388. 
 19.  Time Staff, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016), 
https://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/. 
 20.  Remarks by President Trump at the Economic Club of New York, White House 
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passed the disastrous trade deals that encouraged the shuttering of 
American plants and the offshoring of American jobs by the 
millions.  In short, the failed political class sold out American workers, 
sold out American prosperity, and sold out the American Dream.’21 
The background of current US trade policy then clearly resonates 
with two of the elements of thick populism.  Some of the specific issues 
raised by the US as justifications for actions taken in blocking 
appointments to the AB can also be analyzed along these lines.  Under 
this view of populism, populists are ‘anti-establishment; they are 
cynical of existing institutions such as … courts [and] prefer to put 
their faith in the wisdom and virtues of ordinary people.’22  The US has 
repeatedly criticized the doctrine of precedent that has developed at the 
AB.  In July 2019, the US Ambassador to the WTO commented to the 
WTO General Council: 
With regard to precedent, the Facilitator’s Report highlights the 
widely divergent views among Members on the value of prior 
Appellate Body reports.  The Report suggests agreement among 
Members that “precedent” is not created through WTO dispute 
settlement.  Yet, time and again, some Members insist that a panel 
must adhere to the interpretation in past Appellate Body reports.  And, 
time and again, the Appellate Body insists that panels must adhere to 
past reports absent undefined “cogent reasons”, a term that appears 
nowhere in the DSU.  These assertions on the value of interpretations 
in prior reports are, as we have explained, directly contrary to the DSU 
and the WTO Agreement.23 
A rail against precedent can be understood through the lens of 
populism as an attempt to restrict the power and law-creating ability of 
a court – and not just any court, but an international one, even further 
removed from the ordinary American people.  The same can be said 
for the US insistence on deference to domestic methods in trade 
remedy investigations, most notably the practice of zeroing in dumping 
investigations. The criticisms are about stripping power from an 
institution of elites and returning it (at least one step closer) to the 
 
(November 12, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-economic-club-new-york-new-york-ny/. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Albert W. Dzur & Carolyn M. Hendriks, Thick populism: democracy-enhancing 
popular participation, POLICY STUDIES 334, 336 (2018). 
 23.  Dennis Shea, Statements Delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea – WTO General 
Council Meeting July 23, 2019, U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, July 
23, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-
dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-july-23-2019/. 
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people. 
B. Thin Populism: Differentiation, Fracture and Othering 
Thin populism, as defined by Nijman and Werner, is a ‘thin-
centered ideology that can be – and indeed has been – linked to 
different political agendas.’24 What matters here is how politics is done, 
not the substantive agenda being sought.  Nijman and Werner identify 
two ways of doing politics that align with populism. First, and 
overlapping with thick populism, a technique of ‘mutually 
constitutive’ opposition between the elite and the ordinary person, such 
that content is created primarily through ‘differentiation and fracture’ 
rather than particular substantive goals.25  Second, ‘a practice of 
‘othering’ rather than that it aims to serve the health and cohesion of 
the civitas and polity as a whole’.26 
Just as with thick populism, the positioning of the US’s policies 
and tactics as anti-global elite is clear.  The second feature of thin 
populism is also present:  in that the US position is unashamedly 
positioned to serve (perceived) US interests no matter the cost to the 
wider international community as a whole.  Although President Trump 
insisted at the World Economic Forum in 2018 that ‘American First 
does not mean America alone’,27 on the issue of blocking appointments 
to the AB, America is very much alone.  At a meeting of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) on 18 December 2019, a proposal 
was circulated calling the launch of selection processes to fill all six 
vacancies.  The proposal stresses the ‘urgency and importance of 
filling the vacancies in the Appellate Body’ and has the support of 91 
WTO members including the EU, China and Russia.28 A similar 
 
 24.  Janne E. Nijman & Wouter E. Werner, Populism and International Law: What 
Backlash and Which Rubicon?, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L. 3, 6 (2018). 
 25.  Lukasz Gruszczynski & Jessica Lawrence, Trump, International Trade and 
Populism, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L.19, 23 (2018); Nijman & Werner, supra note 25, at 6. 
 26.  See Nijman & Werner, supra note 25, at 6. 
 27.  Donald Trump, President Trump’s Davos Address in Full, WORLD ECON. F. (January 
26, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/president-donald-trumps-davos-
address-in-full-8e14ebc1-79bb-4134-8203-95efca182e94/. 
 28.  Proposal by Afghanistan; Angola; Argentina; Australia; Benin; Plurinational State 
Of Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Cameroon; Canada; 
Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo; Costa Rica; Côte D’ivoire; 
Cuba; Democratic Republic Of Congo; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El 
Salvador; Eswatini; The European Union; Gabon; The Gambia; Ghana; Guatemala; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Israel; Kazakhstan; 
Kenya; Republic Of Korea; Lesotho; Liechtenstein; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; North Macedonia; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; 
Peru; Qatar; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; 
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proposal in October had the support of 115 WTO members.29 No 
country has spoken out in support of the US actions.  In contrast, the 
lack of appointments has been described as ‘deeply concerning’,30 
‘alarming’31 and the US actions as an ‘illegal blockage’.32 
IV. BACKLASHES TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
It is clear then that the US actions can be viewed as stemming 
from a populist position. Can we also view them as a backlash to the 
WTO?  Just as with populism, definitions here are important. In the 
context of international courts, Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch 
differentiate between ‘push back’ and ‘backlash’: 
We thus define pushback as ordinary resistance occurring within 
the confines of the system but with the goal of reversing developments 
in law. We define backlash as extraordinary resistance challenging the 
authority of an IC with the goal of not only reverting to an earlier 
situation of the law, but also transforming or closing the IC.33 
The actions of the US in blocking reappointments is more than 
mere pushback: it is not acting within the system but is rather crippling 
the functionality of the system.  It is seeking to transform the way that 
the AB operates. Although specific decisions and disagreement over 
substantive points of law have been singled out by the US, Madsen et 
al explain that a backlash can be triggered by a single decision: but are 
‘energized by broader social and political cleavages, which also 
explain the choice of the extraordinary measures’.34  Caron and Shirlow 
offer a definition of backlash as ‘intense and sustained public 
disapproval of a system accompanied by aggressive steps to resist the 
system and to remove its legal force’.35  This is exactly what the US 
 
South Africa; Switzerland; The Separate Customs Territory Of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen And 
Matsu; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; Uruguay; The 
Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Appellate Body 
Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.15 (6 December 2019). 
 29.  See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William 
Rappard on 15 August 2019, WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/433 (29 October 2019). 
 30.  Id. at ¶10.3. 
 31.  Id. at ¶10.30. 
 32.  Id. at ¶10.14. 
 33.  Mikael Rask Madsen et al., Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the 
Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L.  J. OF L. 197, 203 (2018). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  David Caron & Esm. . . Shirlow, Dissecting Backlash: The Unarticulated Causes of 
Backlash and its Unintended Consequences, in Andreas Follesdal and Geir Ulfstein, The 
Judicilization of International Law: A Mixed Blessing? 159, 160 (Oxford University Press, 
2018). 
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actions have done – by removing the avenue to appeal panel decisions, 
the legal force of the WTO dispute settlement system has been 
removed. 
A backlash against international courts is not necessarily new – 
this has been written about in the human rights context with both the 
‘Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash’;36 and international courts in 
West, East and Southern Africa.37 There are generally two types of 
ways that a country will express disapproval with an international 
court.  The first way is threaten to leave the court system. Examples of 
countries that have followed through with this threat are Venezuela 
pulling out of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rwanda 
leaving the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Burundi 
leaving the International Criminal Court.38 Such exits have mostly had 
very little impact on the court itself. 
The second way is to interfere with the functioning of the Court 
– as is being done in the WTO.  This has been seen before in the context 
of the South African Development Community Tribunal (‘SADCT’) – 
Zimbabwe’s action in blocking reappointments (along with 
withdrawing itself from the SADCT) had the end result of effectively 
terminating the SADCT.39  This example raises an interesting point of 
comparison because Zimbabwe was very open about wanting to end 
the SADCT.  The US however is seeking reform of the WTO, not 
termination of the institution: yet its actions have effectively halted the 
functioning of part of it.  Regardless, the actions certainly fit 
definitions of backlash generally and those specific to international 
courts.  How then have countries reacted to the situation caused by the 
US backlash? 
V. STATE RESPONSES 
In his farewell speech to the WTO, former AB member Peter Van 
Den Bossche looked to the then future possibility that the AB would 
cease functioning: 
One can predict with confidence that, once the Appellate Body is 
 
 36.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
 37.  See Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and 
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 293 (2016). 
 38.  Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSPECTIVES 
ON POLITICS 1, 2 (2019). 
 39.  Id. 
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paralyzed, the losing party will in most cases appeal the panel report 
and thus prevent it from becoming legally binding. Why would WTO 
members still engage in panel proceedings if panel reports are likely to 
remain unadopted and thus not legally binding?40 
However, the breaking of the WTO AB has seemed inevitable for 
some time.  Countries are nevertheless still initiating complaints within 
the dispute settlement system. As Ambassador Sunanta Kangvalkulkij, 
the 2018 DSB chair noted: 
The DSB is facing a unique situation, even contradictory. On the 
one hand, the ongoing impasse on the appointment of the vacant 
Appellate Body Members questions the survival of the dispute 
settlement system as we know it. On the other, dispute settlement 
activity has been on the rise, emphasizing the WTO Members’ reliance 
on the system. This somewhat contradictory situation has seen DSB 
activity significantly boosted during 2018.41 
2018 was of course an extraordinary year.  The US tariffs on steel 
and aluminum saw a massive number of cases lodged in protest.  
Retaliatory tariffs placed on US goods by countries were met with 
cases lodged by the US.  But even taking 2018 as an outlier, case 
numbers show that the US blocking of AB appointments has not (yet) 
impacted use of the WTO dispute settlement system.  Although there 
is a general downward trend in use (as seen in figure 1, below), this 









 40.  Peter Van den Bosshe, Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Peter Van den 
Bosshe, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/farwellspeech_peter_van_den_bossche_e.htm. 
 41.  Sunata Kangvalkulkij, WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Developments in 2018, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (April 10, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/sunata_19_e.htm. 
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Figure 1: Number of WTO disputes by year 
 
Three cases from 2017 (DS523,42 DS52943 and DS53444) and one 
from 2018 (DS541) have resulted in a panel report.45 No case brought 
in 2019 has reached the stage of a panel report yet.  States must have 
known when bringing a case that – prior to 11 December 2019 – they 
were facing at least a two year wait until a report would be handed 
down, and longer than that for the appellate process to take place.  Now 
the timeline is even more unsure.  Yet States kept bringing requests for 
consultations from 2017 to the current day.  
Some countries acknowledge this reality publicly.  For example, 
the EU requested consultations with the United States regarding 
countervailing and antidumping duties the United States had imposed 
on Spanish olives on 29 January 2019.46 At the time, European 
 
 42.  Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube 
Products (Turkey), WTO Doc. WT/DS523 (May 8, 2019). 
 43.  Panel Report, Australia — Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS529 (December 4, 2019).   
 44.  Panel Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential 
Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS534 (October 16, 
2019).   
 45.  Panel Report, India — Export Related Measures, WTO Doc. WT/ DS541 (December 
12, 2019). 
 46.  Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States — Anti-dumping 










1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
SAUNDERS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/21  1:11 PM 
184 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:172 
Parliament briefing paper notes on the case recognised the difficulties 
facing the AB:  
At the same time, owing to the blockage by the US of nominations 
of WTO Appellate Body members, the dispute settlement system itself 
is facing a severe backlog and risks becoming inoperable by the end of 
2019.47 
Other countries choose not to mention the impasse when bringing 
complaints.  For example, Australia requested consultations with India 
over Indian sugarcane subsidies on 1 March 2019.48 A press release 
from Simon Birmingham, the Minister for Trade, stated: 
Australia launched formal WTO consultations against India in 
February to seek the winding back of subsidies inconsistent with WTO 
rules. Australia strongly supports the multilateral trading system, with 
the WTO at its core.49  
Why then are countries still using the WTO dispute settlement 
system – whether they acknowledge the difficulties the AB is facing 
or not?  One reason could be the possible use of WTO consultations to 
pressure other countries to change their behavior, whether or not a 
panel is ever convened.  For example, following the U.S. steel tariffs 
in 2018, Canada50 and Mexico51 initiated WTO complaints.  Canada 
and Mexico were then able to get the United States to agree to drop the 
tariffs on Canadian and Mexican steel in May 2019, and their WTO 
complaints were subsequently withdrawn.52  However the success in 
negotiating the withdrawal of U.S. tariffs could also be attributed to 
counter tariffs that Canada and Mexico had placed on U.S. products – 
counter tariffs that were themselves subject to WTO complaints from 
 
 47.  JANA TITIEVSKAIA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DUTIES ON 
IMPORTS OF SPANISH RIPE OLIVES 2 (2019),      
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/635558/EPRS_ATA(2019)635
558_EN.pdf.      
 48.  Request for Consultations by Australia, India — Measures Concerning Sugar and 
Sugarcane, WTO Doc. WT/DS580/1 (Mar. 1, 2019).  
 49.  Press Release, Simon Birmingham & Bridget McKenzie, Australia Takes Next Step 
to Help Australian Sugar Industry, MINISTER FOR TRADE, TOURISM AND INV. (Jul. 12, 2019), 
https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/simon-birmingham/media-release/australia-takes-
next-step-help-australian-sugar-industry.   
 50.  Request for Consultations by Canada, United States — Certain Measures on Steel 
and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 1, 2018). 
 51.  Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Certain Measures on Steel 
and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 7, 2018).      
 52.  Justine Coyne, Canada, Mexico Drop WTO Complaints on U.S. Metals Tariffs, S&P 
GLOBAL (July 11, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-
news/metals/071119-canada-mexico-drop-wto-complaints-on-us-metals-tariffs.  
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the U.S.53 
Another reason for the ongoing use of the WTO system may be 
an attempt to preserve its functioning.  To this end, the EU and Canada 
entered into an agreement for an alternate, interim appeal process on 
25 July 2019.54  The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that the 
goal is to maintain the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement 
system: 
Determined to preserve the essential principles and features of the 
WTO dispute settlement system which include its binding character 
and two levels of adjudication through an independent and impartial 
appellate review of panel reports…55 
The EU and Canada thus continue to use the WTO dispute 
settlement system for the panel stage.  Under the agreement, if the AB 
is unable to hear appeals ‘due to an insufficient number of its 
members’56 neither the EU nor Canada will appeal the panel report, but 
will instead take the matter to alternative arbitration.  The alternative 
arbitration is designed to ‘to replicate as closely as possible all 
substantive and procedural aspects’ of the WTO AB and appellate 
process,57 and its members are drawn from former AB members.58  In 
a joint statement, the EU and Canada reaffirmed their shared desire to 
preserve the WTO system: 
An effective and binding dispute settlement system, which 
provides for the possibility of appealing panel reports, seeks to 
preserve the rights and obligations of WTO members. 
This interim arrangement helps to preserve access to such a 
system, promoting security and predictability in the resolution of WTO 
disputes to ensure the stability of international trade.59 
 
 53.  Request for Consultations by the United States, Canada — Additional Duties on 
Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/1 (July 16, 2018); Request 
for Consultations by the United States, Mexico — Additional Duties on Certain Products from 
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/D560/1 (July 16, 2018).       
 54.  European Commission, Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
DSU: Canada and the European Union, EUR. COMM’N (Jul. 25, 2019),      
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158273.pdf.  
 55.  Id. at pmbl.  
 56.  Id. at 1.      
 57.  Id. at art 2.      
 58.  Id. at art 3.      
 59.  European Commission, Joint Statement by the European Union and Canada on an 
Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, EUR. COMM’N (Jul. 25, 2019),      
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2053.       
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In October 2019, the EU and Norway entered into an identical 
interim appeal agreement.60  The EU once again reaffirmed the primacy 
of the WTO dispute settlement system in a statement on the agreement: 
The EU’s foremost priority remains to ensure an effective 
functioning of the existing WTO Appellate Body. The interim 
arrangement has however become necessary as a contingency measure 
given the long-standing blockage in the appointments of the Appellate 
Body members.61 
The EU’s actions in using the WTO dispute settlement system 
despite the crippling of the AB are a push back against the United 
States‘      own backlash: acts to make the system functional and render 
the U.S. actions less powerful in their consequence. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The U.S. backlash against the WTO AB can be understood as a 
populist response – and indeed, there is evidence that backlashes 
against international courts in general are more likely to be undertaken 
by governments with populist policies.62  It is impossible to predict 
now how the impasse will resolve.  If there is a change of 
administration at the U.S. election in November 2020, will a newly 
elected President pursue the same AB tactics as the Trump 
administration has?  If a non-populist President is elected, and the 
theory that backlash is caused by populist policies is correct, then it 
would follow that the United States will cease blocking appointments 
and allow the AB to function once again.  There is precedent for 
countries reembracing international courts and reversing backlashes 
following the defeat of the populist government that initiated the 
backlash.63 Yet the U.S. position may not be quite so simple. Blocking 
of appointments did occur under the Obama administration, suggesting 
the U.S. frustration with the AB may be bipartisan. However, 
appointments were eventually made in all three cases – it is only under 
President Trump, and his appointed trade representative Robert 
Lighthizer that AB vacancies have not been filled. Nonetheless, the 
 
 60.  European Commission, Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
DSU: European Union and Norway, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2019),           
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158394.pdf.      
 61.  European Commission, EU and Norway Agree on Interim Appeal System in Wake of 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body blockage, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2019),      
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2074.      
 62.  See generally Voeten, supra note 39.  
 63.  Id. at 12.       
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WTO is not popular with segments of U.S. voters, and even 
Democratic candidates may not wish to seem too pro-WTO.  
If the current situation does continue – either because of a Trump 
victory in 2020 or a continuation of the policy by a new U.S. President 
– the question becomes how will other countries respond?  The EU 
actions in simultaneously embracing the WTO panel system and 
providing an alternate means for appeal show one route where the 
consequences of backlash is deliberately minimized.  It is possible that 
more countries will join the EU alternate system – just as Norway did 
in October 2019.  It may reach a point where the AB alternative has 
enough membership to form a critical mass, causing other countries to 
join for fear of being left out. The United States is, after all, just one of 
the 164 members of the WTO.  Although its economy and impact on 
global trade is huge, there is a legitimate question as to whether it 
would want to be a perpetual outsider to a system that contained the 
EU and, perhaps in the future, countries such as China, Brazil and 
India.  While the current impasse means such countries cannot gain 
binding judgments from the WTO DSB about US policies, this effect 
cuts both ways: the United States is no longer able to challenge 
Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods in the WTO and receive a binding 
decision.  It should also be noted that the United States agreed to the 
formation of the current system during the Uruguay round – and 
although support for the AB was ‘lukewarm’64, the United States was 
committed in the early days of the WTO to ‘ensuring that the system 
worked’.65  A functioning WTO dispute settlement system was, until 
fairly recently, seen to be in the United States‘      own interests.   
In 1950, the allied powers decided there was no point in pursuing 
an International Trade Organization without U.S. involvement.  70 
years on, the world economy is very different.  Further, countries have 
had 25 years of experience with a binding trade dispute settlement 
system – an experience that countries have for the most part seen as 
positive – and it is not at all clear that WTO members will fall in line 
with the U.S. position this time.  Far from causing a retreat from the 
WTO, the U.S. backlash has thus far been met with renewed embrace 
of the institution and its dispute settlement system from other WTO 
members.  Ironically, the United States is not alone in its calls for WTO 
reform.66  However its choice to force the hand of other WTO members 
 
 64.  Gregory Shaffer et al., The Extensive (But Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate 
Body, 79 L. & CONT. PROBS. 237, 245 (2016).         
 65.  Id. at 249.      
 66.  Michael Smith, Australia Calls on China to Collaborate on WTO Reform, FINANCIAL 
REVIEW (Aug. 2. 2019), https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australia-calls-on-china-to-
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by blocking AB appointments may mean it is ultimately left without a 
bargaining chip, as other countries continue to use the WTO dispute 
settlement system despite the U.S. actions. 
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